What Each Party Can See

Veilix hides the link between a deposit and a later withdrawal. It does not hide the deposit, and it does not hide the withdrawal. This table is the practical version of that sentence.

On a deposit

Fact	Depositor	Everyone else
Depositor address	Yes	Yes. They signed.
Asset and amount that entered the treasury	Yes	Yes
New commitment	Yes	Yes
Spending key, blinding, note string	Yes	No, unless the note was copied or the ciphertext was opened
Encrypted output	Ciphertext they can open, if they sealed it	Ciphertext only

A deposit is a public payment into the treasury plus a new leaf. The privacy starts after that leaf exists, when later spends do not point back at it.

On a withdrawal

Fact	Sender of the note	Relayer	Recipient	Everyone else
Which note was spent	Yes	No	No	No
Nullifiers	Yes	Yes	Yes, on-chain	Yes
Amount leaving the pool	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fee and relayer account	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Recipient address	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Change commitment	Yes	The commitment only	No	The commitment only
Change note secret	Yes, if they saved it or can decrypt	No	No	No
That the recipient signed	No	No	No	No. The relayer signed.

The recipient learns that they were paid a certain amount of a certain asset. They do not learn which deposit funded it, and they do not receive a note.

The indexer and the relayer

Both see the public proof payload, because they have to transport it. They do not receive the note string on the withdrawal path. They cannot match a nullifier to a commitment any better than any other observer.

The indexer also stores every leaf, including ciphertext. Holding the leaves does not reveal who owns them.

What still correlates

Cryptography removes the explicit pointer. It does not remove side channels:

• Amount. A withdrawal of an unusual size shortly after a deposit of that size is suggestive. Partial withdrawals and change notes exist so the public amount does not have to copy the deposit.
• Time. A deposit and a withdrawal in the same quiet minute are easier to pair than the same pair separated by many other notes.
• Asset. Trees are separate. A wBTC withdrawal can only come from the wBTC tree, which may be a smaller set than SOL.
• Behavior. Using the same recipient, the same relayer, and the same time of day across many payments builds a pattern outside the proof.
• The note itself. Anyone you show the note string to can spend it and can see its amount.

Shielded balance

No account on-chain sums “this wallet’s Veilix balance.” That sum exists only where the notes can be opened: in the user’s saved notes, or in a scan of ciphertexts with the wallet encryption key. An observer can sum the treasury. They cannot assign slices of it to wallets.